[Par-reg] Parshat Matot - shiur

[Menachem Leibtag]

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THE TANACH STUDY CENTER [http://www.tanach.org]

           In Memory of Rabbi Abraham Leibtag

     Shiurim in Chumash & Navi by Menachem Leibtag

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PARSHAT MATOT  [Parshanut]

 

The opening pasuk of Parshat Matot is simply a 'gold mine'
for those who enjoy the study of "parshanut" [the Hebrew
word for biblical commentary].

In this week's shiur, we discuss how the classical
commentators grappled with the difficulties that arise when
studying Bamidbar 30:2.

 

INTRODUCTION

     There are two classic approaches to the study of
"parshanim". The simplest is simply to read the pasuk, and
then immediately afterward, to read the commentary; thus
enhancing one's understanding and appreciation of what the
Torah is telling us.

     Another approach is to read each pasuk carefully while
considering its context, but before reading any commentary -
to attempt on your own to consider any problems that arise,
and then to contemplate possible answers.  Then, after you
have thought through all the various possibilities, to read
the various commentaries, noting if they raised the same (or
similar) questions and/or answers.

     Even though the latter approach is quite tedious, it
usually leads to a much better appreciation and
understanding of the various commentaries.

     In the following shiur, we will employ this method, as
we study the opening pasuk of Parshat Matot.

 

LOTS OF QUESTIONS

     Let's begin by taking a look at the first pasuk, and
then making a list of questions that arise:

"And MOSHE spoke to the Heads of the Tribes of Bnei Yisrael
saying: THIS is the 'DAVAR' [translation unclear] that God
has commanded: If a man makes a vow or takes an
obligation...."  (see 32:2-3)

 

     The first obvious question that catches almost
everyone's attention relates to the fact that these laws
about "nedarim" [vows] are directed specifically to the
"rashei ha'matot" [tribal leaders].  In contrast to most all
other laws in the Bible, that are directed to the entire
nation - for some reason, these laws are different.

Before we attempt to answer this question, let's note some
other related questions that come to our attention:

*         When did God inform Moshe about these laws?  Were
they only given now in the fortieth year, or had God told
them to Moshe at an earlier time?  

[Note that this set of laws doesn't begin with the classic
'opening pasuk' of "va'ydaber Hashem el Moshe lay'mor...
daber el Bnei Yisrael..." - And God spoke to Moshe
saying...]

*         Were these laws supposed to be kept 'secret' from
the rest of the nation, i.e. were they intended only for the
'leaders'; or was everyone supposed to know them? 

*          Even if these laws were given to Moshe at an
earlier time, why are they recorded specifically at this
point in Sefer Bamidbar? 

*         Why does Moshe introduce these laws with the
introductory phrase "ZEH HA'DAVAR"? (see 30:2)

 

With these additional questions in mind, let's return to our
opening question.

 

EXCLUSIVITY

     Let's begin by discussing why Moshe presents these laws
directly to the tribal leaders, and not to the entire
nation.   

     In Sefer Vayikra, we find several instances where a set
of laws are given to a 'select' group.  For example, note
how the laws of how to offer a sacrifice in Parshat Tzav are
given directly to the "kohanim" (see Vayikra 6:1-2).
However, there the reason is obvious, for only the kohanim
need to know those laws. 

     How about these laws concerning "nedarim" in Parshat
Matot?

There are two possible directions to we can entertain.
Either:

1.   They are indeed intended to be heard ONLY by the tribal
leaders - if so, we must attempt to understand why the laws
of "nedarim" are special in this regard.

2.   The entire nation is supposed to hear these laws - if
so, we must explain why the tribal leaders receive them
first.

 

Let's see how we find these two approaches in the classic
commentators.  Let's begin with Rashi's commentary on 30:2:

"He [Moshe] gave honor to the princes to teach them first,
then afterward he taught [these laws] to Bnei Yisrael..."

 

Note how Rashi, in his opening line, assumes that the reader
was already bothered by this question; and he immediately
provides an answer.  He follows the second approach, i.e.
the entire nation heard these laws as well - but explains
that the princes were taught first, as an honor to the
tribal leaders. 

     This explanation immediately raises another question:
How about when all of the other mitzvot were taught - were
they also first taught to the "rashei ha'matot", and to the
people later on?

     Rashi claims that this was indeed the common practice -
and proves his claim from a pasuk in Sefer Shmot, that
describes what transpired when Moshe came down from Har
Sinai with the second Luchot:

"...And how do we know that all of the other mitzvot were
taught in this manner? As the pasuk states [when Moshe
descended from Har Sinai with the second luchot]: Then
Aharon and all of the PRINCES of the congregation approached
him [i.e. Moshe], and Moshe spoke to them [re: the laws].
Then AFTERWARD, ALL of BNEI YISRAEL came forward and Moshe
COMMANDED them concerning ALL of the laws that God had
instructed him on Har Sinai (see Shmot 34:29-32)."

 

[Note that we've included the entire quote of 34:32 (even
though Rashi only quoted half of it). That's because Rashi
takes for granted that you know the continuation (which is
key to understand his "pirush").  As a rule of thumb -
whenever Rashi (or any commentator) quotes another pasuk -
look up that pasuk in its entirety and pay careful attention
to its context.]

 

     Even though Rashi has established that ALL of the
mitzvot were given in this manner (first to the princes and
then to the people), our opening question still remains, but
now in a different form.  If indeed this was that manner
that all the laws were transmitted - why does the Torah
emphasize this point specifically in regard to the laws of
"nedarim"?

Rashi deals with this question as well, explaining that the
Torah does this intentionally in order that we infer a
specific halacha:

"...And why is this mentioned here? To TEACH us that a vow
can be annulled by a SINGLE judge - if he is an EXPERT,
otherwise a group of three "hedyotot" ['non-experts] is
required to annul a vow."

 

     In other words, by informing us that Moshe first gave
these laws to the "rashei ha'matot", we can infer that there
is something special about their status in regard to these
laws of "nedarim' that follow. This allowed Chazal [the
Sages] to conclude the special law that an expert judge
["yachid mumche"] can annul such vow on his own.

     To strengthen his interpretation, Rashi then raises the
possibility of the first approach (i.e. that these laws were
given exclusively to the tribal leaders) - in order to
refute it:

"... OR - [possibly] Moshe made have told these laws ONLY to
the tribal leaders [and hence not to all of Bnei Yisrael] - 

-- it states here ZEH HA'DAVAR (32:2) and it states in
regard to SHCHUTEI CHUTZ [offering a sacrifice outside the
Mishkan] the phrase ZEH HA'DAVAR (see Vayikra 17:2) - just
like those laws were directed not only to the priests, but
ALSO to the entire nation [as it states "speak to Aharon,
his sons, and ALL BNEI YISRAEL" (17:2); so too these laws
[of NEDARIM were given not only to the princes but also to
ALL of Bnei Yisrael.]"

 

Rashi completes his commentary by adding two additional
points concerning why the Torah records how Moshe introduced
these laws with the phrase "zeh ha'dvar..."

"We learn from here that Moshe was prophet of a higher level
than other prophets could say only: "KOH amar Hashem" -
[thus God said] - but only Moshe could state precisely "ZEH
HA'DAVAR..." - THIS was the word of God..."

 

     Finally, Rashi concludes this commentary with another
"halacha" that Chazal infer from this pasuk concerning HOW
(i.e. in what manner) the judge must pronounce the annulment
of a vow.

 

PSHAT vs. DRASH

     As usual, Rashi's commentary anchors itself on several
MIDRASHIM (see Sifri 153, and Nedarim 88a).  In other words,
he explains the pasuk based on statements made by earlier
commentators, as recorded in the Midrash. 

In contrast, other commentators such as Ibn Ezra, Rashbam,
and Ramban will usually anchor their interpretation in what
they feel is the simple understanding ["pshat"] of the pasuk
- even if that understanding may contradict a Midrash.
Nonetheless, they will usually consider the opinion raised
by the Midrash with the utmost respect - but they do not
automatically accept it.

  Let's see how this will help us understand the
interpretations advanced by Rashbam and Ramban, as they
relate to the topics discussed by Rashi.  Afterward, we will
discuss Ibn Ezra, Chizkuni and Seforno.

 

RASHBAM

     Rashbam, clearly bothered by all of the questions that
we raised above, approaches all of them from a very
different angle.  His first consideration is the
juxtaposition of these laws to the laws of Tmidim u'Musafim
that were found at the end of Parshat Pinchas. 

In essence, Rashbam considers this section of laws
concerning "nedarim" as a direct continuation of the laws
that concluded Parshat Pinchas; and hence, we no longer have
a strangely worded introductory pasuk, since it isn't
introductory!  Carefully follow how he presents his key
points: 

"I was asked a question in the city of Loshdon, Aniyob
(somewhere in France): 'According to pshat - where else do
find such a parshiya that begins in this manner, [where
Moshe commands mitzvot] but does not begin with VA'YDABER
HASHEM EL MOSHE... [informing us first that God told these
laws to Moshe]?'  -

 and this was my [Rashbam's] answer:

Above [at the end of Parshat Pinchas/ 29:39] it states: 

"These [korbanot] you shall bring on your holidays in
ADDITION to your VOWS [nedarim & nedavot...]" 

[This pausk teaches us that] you must offer all of your
voluntary korbanot [that you had taken upon yourself by a
vow] during one of the three pilgrimage holidays - in order
that you do not transgress the commandment of 'keeping a
promise on time ["baal t'acher"/ see Mesechet Rosh Ha'shana
4a.]

 

Therefore, Rashbam maintains that God told Moshe these laws
of "nedarim" at the same time that he told him the laws of
the korbanot of the holidays in Bamidbar chapters 28->29.
Since those laws began with "va'ydaber Hashem...", there is
no need to repeat that phrase once again.  Instead, the
Torah tells us that after Moshe told the people the laws of
the korbanot (see 30:1):

"he [Moshe] went to the tribal leaders - WHO are their
JUDGES - to tell them to teach these laws concerning NEDARIM
to ALL of Bnei Yisrael. When he did this, Moshe told them:
God has just commanded me to tell you that everyone must
offer the NEDARIM and NEDAVOT during the holidays (see
29:39), therefore should anyone make a vow [neder]...  they
should not BE LATE in fulfilling it..."

 

     First of all, note how beautifully Rashbam explains the
phrase "LO YACHEL DEVARO". Usually, "yachel" is translated -
he should not PROFANE (or break his pledge/ JPS). Based on
his interpretation, Rashbam translates "yachel" as DELAY,
and brings excellent examples from Breishit 8:10 and Shoftim
3:25.

[Note also how he boldly states that according to pshat, any
other translation of "yachel" here is a MISTAKE!]

 

     In summary, Rashbam claims that chapter 30 is simply
direct continuation of chapter 29, for one is obligated to
fulfill his vows (chapter 30) on the holidays (chapter 29).
By recognizing this point, note how Rashbam manages to
answer ALL of the questions raised in our introduction, and
adds a brilliant translation for the word "yachel" within
this context.

     If you don't read him carefully (while paying attention
to the opening questions), you won't appreciate how clever
his pirush is!

[Note as well how the division of chapters makes a 'futile'
attempt to solve Rashbam's opening question, by starting
chapter 30 with the last pasuk in Parshat Pinchas. [Did you
notice this?!] Note how CHAZAL's division according to
parshiyot must be correct, i.e. beginning the new topic in
30:2 - BECAUSE 30:1 forms the completion of of 28:1-2, and
hence SHOULD be the LAST pasuk in chapter 29 instead of the
first pasuk in chapter 30.]

 

RAMBAN

     Ramban begins his commentary dealing with the same
question that bothered Rashbam, but offers a very different
answer! [Note also how Ramban also takes for granted that
the reader has already been bothered by these questions.] 

"The pasuk does not tell us first that God told these laws
to Moshe... like it says by SHCHUTEI CHUTZ and most all
other parshiyot, INSTEAD we are told this at the END of this
parshiya! [There we find a summary:] "These are the laws
that GOD COMMANDED MOSHE... (see 30:17)"

 

     Note how clever this Ramban is! He answers the question
by paying careful attention to the conclusion of this unit.
[Again, this is a classic example of the comprehensive
nature of Ramban's approach.] 

Ramban brings a parallel example from SHCHUTEI CHUTZ (see
Vayikra 17:1-2), clearly in reaction to Rashi's pirush
(which he will soon argue with), even though he doesn't
quote Rashi directly!

[Ramban expects that the reader of his commentary is already
familiar with Rashi, as he himself was!]

 

     But even without this concluding pasuk (i.e. 30:17)
Ramban proves that we need not be bothered by the fact that
Moshe's instruction to the "rashei ha'matot" is not prefaced
by "va'ydaber Hashem el Moshe...". Ramban brings two other
examples where commandments by Moshe that begin with ZEH
HA'DAVAR are not prefaced with a "va'ydaber Hashem el
Moshe...":

[Furthermore], in Parshat Shmini it states ZEH HA'DAVAR (see
Vayikra 9:6 and its context) without a preface that God had
commanded this, and in relation to keeping the manna [next
to the aron] it states ZEH HA'DAVAR... (see Shmot 16:32)"

 

     Once again, we see the comprehensive nature of Ramban's
methodology, always considering parallel occurrences of
similar phrases or patterns.

     After explaining WHO these tribal leaders are (possibly
those leaders mentioned later in Bamidbar 34:17-29), Ramban
offers an interpretation which is exactly the opposite of
Rashi's, claiming that indeed these laws were given
intentionally ONLY to the tribal leaders:

"And the reason for Moshe saying these laws to the "rashei
ha'matot" - BECAUSE there is no need to teach all of Bnei
Yisrael that a father (or husband) can annul the vow of his
daughter (or wife). Maybe these laws need to kept 'hidden'
so that people will not take their words lightly (should
they know that their promises can be annulled). However, the
judges and leaders of Israel MUST know these laws..."

 

Note how Ramban prefers the 'simple pshat' of the pasuk over
Chazal's interpretation (i.e. the Sifri quoted by Rashi) -
and provides a very good reason that supports his
preference.

 

     On the other hand, Ramban does accept the halacha that
Chazal infer from these psukim, relating this to the special
style that the Torah uses to record this commandment:

"And this does HINT to the MIDRASH CHAZAL that tribal
leaders have special privileges in relation to nedarim that
a "yachid mumche" (expert) can annul a vow on his own..."

 

     Ramban concludes his commentary by noting, as Rashbam
did, the thematic connection to the laws of Tmidim u'Musafim
(based on 29:39), nevertheless reaching a different
conclusion.

 

IBN EZRA

     Ibn Ezra also deals with the thematic connection
between these laws of "nedarim" and the 'neighboring' topics
in Sefer Bamidbar.  However, instead of looking 'backward'
to the halachik sections of Parshat Pinchas, he looks
forward to what transpires in the stories that are recorded
in Parshat Matot, i.e. the war against Midyan and the story
of Bnei Gad and Reuven (chapters 31 & 32).

"In my opinion, this parshiya was given AFTER the war
against MIDYAN (chapter 31), and that is why THAT story is
recorded immediately afterward! [Ibn Ezra then brings an
example of this style from Bamidbar chapter 12.] 

 

     This interpretation is also very creative, for it
claims that these laws were actually given in reaction to an
event that took place at that time!  As you study this Ibn
Ezra, note how he also deals with most all of the above
questions, yet offers very different answers. Let's take a
look:

"Then, (after that battle) the pasuk tells us that Bnei Gad
and Reuven came to Moshe and Elazar and the PRINCES and
requested [to keep Transjordan / see 32:1-5]. At the
conclusion of their discussion, [when the deal is finalized]
it states: 

"Then Moshe gave instructions [concerning Bnei Gad] to
Elazar and Yehoshua and the RASHEI AVOT HA'MATOT l'BNEI
YISRAEL" (see 32:28), 

after Moshe had just forewarned Bnei Gad u'Reuven that
'whatever you PROMISE - you must keep' " (see 32:24)..."

 

     Ibn Ezra prefers both this thematic (making and keeping
promises) and textual ("rashei ha'matot") parallel to
chapter 30, in order to explain the location of this
parshiya at this point in Sefer Bamdibar; over Rashbam's and
Ramban's parallel to Parshat Pinchas. 

Note also how Ibn Ezra agrees with Rashi that the "rashei
ha'matot" were supposed to relay these laws to Bnei Yisrael;
however he provides a different proof, based on the LAMED in
L'BNEI YISRAEL in 30:2!

 

CHIZKUNI

     Chizkuni opens with yet another creative answer to our
original question.  He states:

"k'dei l'hachirach et ha'am" - in order to enforce this upon
the people"   

 

Like Rashi, he agrees that these laws were indeed intended
to be taught to EVERYONE (arguing with Ramban). However,
Chizkuni provides a different reason for why the "rashei
ha'matot" are singled out.  Unlike Rashi who claims that it
is an issue of 'honor', he claims that they are taught
first, for it is their responsibility to enforce these laws.
Chizkuni understands that the Torah wants the leaders to
make sure that unnecessary vows are annulled (by those who
can),  OR that the leaders should make sure that the people
keep their promises. 

     Afterward, Chizkuni continues by quoting from both Ibn
Ezra and Rashi.

 

SEFORNO

     Finally, Seforno adds a very creative explanation for
the phrase ZEH HA'DAVAR. He claims as follows:

In the original commandment at Har Sinai - "Do not to make
an oath in God's Name (and not fulfill it) lest God's Name
be desecrated" (see Vayikra 19:12) - one may conclude that
this would refer to anyone making a vow.

Here in Parshat Matot, claims Seforno, the Torah makes an
exception. That law applies only to males - for they are
'their own bosses' ["b'rshut atzmo"].  However, a wife or a
daughter, because she is under the jurisdiction of her
father (or husband), should she not fulfill a vow, it would
not be such a terrible desecration of God's Name, for the
person hearing this vow being made immediately realizes that
she may not able to fulfill it.  As the potential "chillul
Hashem" is less, the Torah provides a special avenue through
which she can annul her vow. 

This original interpretation (even though is may sound a bit
chauvinist) takes into consideration the details of these
laws in relation to a similar law recorded earlier, and
explains both the phrase ZEH HA'DAVAR as well as the nature
of the specific details of these laws.

 

NEXT TIME  

     Hopefully, our shiur has highlighted how "parshanut"
can be better understood by spending a little time first
considering possibilities, instead of just reading right
away what each one has to say.  In other words, if you study
Chumash the same way the commentators themselves did
(thinking first), you'll have a better chance of
appreciating the treasure that they have left us.

 

                           shabbat shalom,

                           menachem