[Par-reg] Ki-teyze - shiur #2
Menachem Leibtag
tsc at bezeqint.net
Wed Sep 14 16:26:51 EDT 2005
*************************************************************
THE TANACH STUDY CENTER [http://www.tanach.org]
In Memory of Rabbi Abraham Leibtag
Shiurim in Chumash & Navi by Menachem Leibtag
*************************************************************
for PARSHAT KI-TETZEH [& CHODESH ELUL!]
There are two psukim in this week's Sedra that can be
understood in many different ways, yet no matter how we
interpret them, their underlying message is especially
important for the month of Elul (and the rest of the year as
well). In the following shiur, we take a break from our
thematic study of Sefer Devarim, to delve into the world of
'parshanut' [Biblical commentary].
INTRODUCTION
Although most of the laws in Parshat Ki-Tetzeh deal with
'mitzvot bein adam le-chavero' [man and his fellow man], one
exception calls our attention:
"Be very careful with regard to [the laws concerning] a
'nega tzara'at' (a type of skin infection) - do exactly
as the levitical priests instruct you" (24:8).
This sort of warning - to observe the laws of 'tzara'at'
[leprosy] - is certainly an anomaly in Sefer Devarim.
First of all, the laws of leprosy were first presented in
Sefer Vayikra (see chapters 13 &14) together with numerous
other laws of 'tum'a' & 'tahara' [spiritual uncleanliness].
However, Sefer Devarim does not remind us concerning any of
those laws (nor any other laws from the first 18 chapters of
Sefer Vayikra), other than this lone mention to keep the laws
of tzara'at.
Secondly, most all of the other laws in Parshat Ki Tetzeh
deal with 'bein adam la-Makom' [matters between man and God],
while this warning seems to be quite different.
Finally, this pasuk doesn't appear to teach us anything new.
Therefore, when studying this pasuk, we must consider
these three issues: i.e. 1) Why do we find here a mitzva bein
adam la-Makom? 2) What specific law is being added that has
not already appeared in Sefer Vayikra? 3) Why does Sefer
Devarim introduce, uncharacteristically, a law from the first
half of Sefer Vayikra?
LEPROSY & MIRIAM [Rashi]
The simplest answer to the above questions is based on
its connection to the next pasuk:
"Remember what God did to Miriam, on your journey when
you left the land of Egypt" (24:9).
This pasuk clearly refers to the incident recorded in
Parshat Beha'alotcha, when Miriam contracts tzara'at following
her complaints regarding Moshe's marriage to an 'isha kushit'
(see Bamidbar 12:1-16).
This juxtaposition of the commandment to remember how Miriam
was punished with tzara'at for speaking 'lashon ha-ra' [evil
talk] against her brother, leads many commentators to the
obvious conclusion that the Torah's 'reminder' concerning
tzara'at is in essence a reminder not to slander. In other
words, by reminding us not to speak lashon ha-ra immediately
after the warning concerning the laws of tzara'at, the Torah
seems to enlist the laws of tzara'at as a (polite) reminder
not to speak lashon ha-ra!
For example, Rashi's opening commentary to this pasuk
seems to make exactly this point:
["Remember what God did to Miriam" (24:9):]
"If one wants to be careful not to contract tzara'at at
all - then don't speak lashon ha-ra [in the first place].
Remember what happened to Miriam when she spoke against
her brother..." (see Rashi 24:9).
Not only does this interpretation reveal the underlying
significance of these laws, it also answers the questions
raised earlier. The laws of tzara'at are mentioned in Parshat
Ki Tetzeh specifically because they in fact do relate to bein
adam le-chavero! It also explains why the pasuk here includes
only a very general warning concerning tzara'at, to get to the
point of lashon ha-ra. However, there is no need to repeat
the technical details of tzara'at, as they have already been
discussed in Sefer Vayikra.
DRASH = PSHAT [Ibn Ezra]
It is worthwhile to note in this context Ibn Ezra's
comments on this pasuk. Not only does he apparently agree
with Rashi's interpretation, he even adds a comment that the
pshat of these psukim in Devarim, supports a midrashic
interpretation in Sefer Vayikra:
"From here (this pasuk) we find support for the midrash
(of Vayikra Rabba 16:1): don't read 'MeTZo'RA' - rather
'MoTZi shem RA'" (a cute abbreviation).
In other words, Ibn Ezra (a big 'fan' of pshat) finds
support for the midrash in Sefer Vayikra concerning the laws
of metzora based on the pshat of the psukim in Sefer Devarim!
NOT SO FAST
Despite the simplicity and beauty of this interpretation,
several serious questions emerge.
First of all, why doesn't the Torah just tell us 'don't
speak lashon ha-ra? What is gained by merely inferring this
conclusion from the story of Miriam and the laws of tzara'at?
Furthermore, does it make sense for the Torah to recall a
'bad story' concerning Miriam in order to teach us not to tell
'bad stories' about other people?!
Finally, why does the Torah emphasize (in 24:8) that we
must follow the procedures specifically in accordance with the
kohanim's instructions? If the message is simply not to speak
lashon ha-ra, the first half of the pasuk would have sufficed
as ample warning.
Due to these difficulties, Rashbam & Chizkuni will
explain these two psukim in a radically different manner. On
the other hand, Rashi and Ramban will remain 'loyal' to the
lashon ha-ra approach; however, their commentaries will
reflect how they grappled with these difficulties as well.
[It is highly recommend that you first study (or at least
read) those commentaries on your own before continuing.]
DON'T BE YOUR OWN DOCTOR! [Rashi]
Let's begin with the 'simple' question: If 24:8 simply
serves as a general warning to follow the proper procedures
regarding tzara'at (as we concluded above), then it would have
sufficed to say, "Be careful to keep the laws of tzara'at."
What are we to learn from the second clause: "follow exactly
what the levitical priests instruct you" (see 24:8)?
Based on this redundancy, the Gemara in Makkot (22a)
concludes that this pasuk includes more than just a general
warning; rather it teaches us an additional law. Rashi cites
the Gemara's explanation that this pasuk forbids an individual
to surgically remove a tzara'at infection from his skin (by
himself) before showing it to the kohen.
Basically, according to this interpretation, this pasuk
teaches us that one 'cannot be his own doctor' with regard to
tzara'at. Instead, he must show his infection to the kohen
(priest) and obediently follow the kohen's 'diagnosis'.
Here we find a classic example of midrash halacha.
Chazal derive an additional halacha (which does not appear
explicitly in the text) from an 'extra' phrase in a pasuk,
based on the content and context of the otherwise superfluous
expression.
[It is important to note that this midrash halacha does
not contradict our earlier conclusion concerning the
connection between tzara'at and lashon ha-ra; it simply
adds an additional law. Note that Rashi brings down both
interpretations! See also Further Iyun section.]
Let's continue now with the more obvious question: i.e.
what does the Torah gain by recalling the incident with
Miriam? Would it not have been more effective to simply
admonish in straightforward fashion: 'Don't speak lashon ha-
ra'?
Most probably for this reason, Rashbam and Chizkuni's
suggest a very different approach.
NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW! [Rashbam]
In contrast to the approach of Rashi & Ibn Ezra (and our
original explanation), that the primary purpose of these
psukim is to prohibit lashon ha-ra, Rashbam points us in a
totally different direction. Let's take a look:
"Be careful to keep the laws of tzara'at: [This comes to
teach us that] even with regard to [an important person]
like King Uziyahu - do not honor him (should he become a
metzora / see Divrei Hayamim II 26:11-22). Instead, send
him outside the camp [as Miriam was sent]. for remember
what happened to Miriam: Even though she was a prophetess
and Moshe's sister, they did not honor her; instead, they
sent her outside the camp..."
[See Rashbam 24:8-9 / In that story in Divrei Hayamim,
King Uziyahu was struck with tzara'at after he haughtily
entered the kodesh kodashim to offer ketoret.]
According to Rashbam, the primary focus of these psukim
relates indeed to the laws of leprosy and 'protektzia' - and
hence has nothing to do with lashon ha-ra.
Note how this interpretation resolves almost all our
questions (raised above). Although the technical details of
tzara'at have already been recorded in Sefer Vayikra, Sefer
Devarim (in its discussion of various laws concerning daily
life in the community of Israel) commands us not to make any
exceptions for special people - i.e. no 'protektzia'!
Hence, the Torah mentions the case of Miriam to emphasize
precisely this point of 'no exceptions' (with regard to
tzara'at). We cannot, therefore, according to Rashbam, infer
from these psukim a conclusive connection between the cause
for tzara'at and lashon ha-ra.
Note as well that the story of Miriam in Parshat
Beha'alotcha provides only 'circumstantial evidence' for such
a connection. Recall that the Torah never states explicitly
that lashon ha-ra was the cause of Miraim's leprosy! In fact,
most other occurrences of tzara'at in Tanach involve the
problem of 'ga'ava' [arrogance] - e.g. the cases of Uziyahu
(see Divrei Hayamim II 26:16-20) and Na'aman and Gechazi (see
Melachim II chapter 5). See also Shmot 4:6-8, 'Ve-akmal'.]
Rashbam is not alone in his approach. Chizkuni (on 24:8-
9) explains these psukim in a similar fashion:
"Keep the laws of tzara'at: Do not grant special honor to
important people by exempting them from banishment from
the camp. Remember what God did to Miriam - even though
she was sister to the king and high priest, she was
nevertheless banished outside the camp for the entire
seven-day period."
Rashbam and Chizkuni agree that the primary purpose of these
psukim is to teach us that everyone is equal under the law,
and hence, not to make exceptions for VIP's. Note, that this
approach as well provides us with a good reason for including
this law in Parshat Ki Tetzeh, as it falls into the category
of bein adam le-chavero, and it reflects God's expectation
that Am Yisrael live by higher moral standard.
How about Ramban? We've intentionally saved him for
last, because his approach (as usual) is the most
comprehensive, addressing textual and thematic parallels to
other parshiot in Chumash. We will show how his approach (in
this case) is both 'educational' like Rashi's and faithful to
pshat no less than Rashbam's.
[Incidentally, this is why Ramban's commentary is usually
much longer and complex than Rashi's. On the other hand,
specifically because of his brevity, Rashi has earned
more widespread popularity.]
REMEMBER THE OTHER 'ZACHOR'S'! [Ramban]
Note, that just about all of the interpretations of 24:8-
9 thus far how considered the warning to follow the laws of
leprosy in 24:8 ['hi-shamer...'] as the primary point- and the
'reminder' to remember what happened to Miriam in 24:9
['zachor...'] as secondary. Ramban will do exactly the
opposite, showing how the Torah's primary commandment is
zachor in 24:9, and hishamer in 24:8 simply serves as a lead
up to the primary point in 24:9!
Ramban begins by quoting Rashi's explanation that
guarding one's tongue against lashon hara prevents the onset
of tzara'at; and (for a change), this time Ramban actually
quotes Rashi because he agrees (and not as a set up to
disagree). However, Ramban takes Rashi's approach one step
further, demonstrating that what Rashi considers 'drash' may
be not only 'pshat', but should even be counted as one of the
613 mitzvot!
"In my opinion this [commandment of zachor in pasuk 24:9]
should be considered a positive commandment - [i.e. it
should be counted as] an actual mitzvat aseh" [see Ramban
24:9].
To our amazement, Ramban considers zachor - what appeared
to be simply a 'reminder' - as a positive commandment to daily
remember (or possibly even recite) the incident involving how
Miriam contracted tzara'at after speaking about her brother.
How does Ramban reach such a daring conclusion that this
should be counted as one of the 613 mitzvot!?
One could suggest that Ramban's approach stems from his
'sensitive ear' to the Torah's use of key phrases. When
Ramban hears the opening phrase: "Zachor et asher asa
Hashem..." he is immediately reminded of three other instances
where the Torah introduces a mitzva with a similar expression:
* 1) Shabbat - "Zachor et yom ha-shabbat" (Shmot 20:7)
* 2) Yetziat Mitzrayim - "Zachor et ha-yom..." (Shmot 13:3)
* 3) amalek - "Zachor et asher asa lecha Amalek..."
(see Devarim 25:17)
Ramban cites these three examples as proof that a pasuk
beginning with the word zachor... constitutes a positive
commandment (a 'mitzvat aseh'); and hence, our case should be
no different.
But what is this mitzva? Why would the Torah have us
remember a 'not so nice' story about Miriam?
Like an artist, Ramban beautifully 'puts all the pieces
together,' explaining this seemingly enigmatic pasuk in light
of our earlier questions. Like Rashi and Ibn Ezra, he points
to lashon ha-ra as the central topic of these psukim. This is
why the incident of Miriam is introduced and why the issue of
tzara'at is mentioned altogether in Parshat Ki-Tetzeh, in the
context of mitzvot bein adam le-chavero.
However, Ramban's interpretation also explains the advantage
of employing Miriam to present this mitzva (rather than
stating it explicitly):
"... Hence, this is a warning (of the Torah) not to speak
lashon ha-ra, commanding us to remember the terrible
punishment that Miriam received [even though she was] a
righteous prophetess, and she spoke only about her
brother (not someone outside the family) and only
privately with her brother (Aharon), not in public, so
that Moshe himself would not be embarrassed... But
despite these good intentions, she was punished. How
much more so must we be careful never to speak lashon ha-
ra... (see Ramban 24:9).
According to Ramban, the Torah doesn't mention Miriam to
tell us how bad her sin was. On the contrary, the incident of
Miriam (who, as everyone knows, was righteous and had only
good intentions) emphasizes how careful we must all be in all
matters which may involve even the slightest degree of lashon
ha-ra. This pasuk reminds us that punishment was administered
even in the case of Miriam's mild lashon ha-ra.
Based on the parallel to other instances of the word
zachor, the Ramban concludes that mere recollection does not
suffice. We are obligated to verbally recount this
unfortunate incident every day [just as Kiddush on Shabbat
fulfills the obligation of 'zachor et yom ha-shabbat
lekadsho...']! Ramban understands these psukim as not merely
some good advice, but as a commandment to retell this incident
on a daily basis, in order that we remember not to make a
similar mistake, even should we have 'good intentions'.
[See also Sifra on Vayikra 26:14 [Torat Kohanim
Bechukotai Alef 2-3]. This probably explains the
'minhag' [custom] of reciting this pasuk each day after
shacharit - see the six 'zechirot' at the conclusion of
shacharit in your siddur!]
Ramban's closing remarks are most significant, as they
reflect another important aspect of his exegetical approach:
"For how could it be that lashon ha-ra - which is
equivalent in its severity to murder - would not be
considered a [full fledged] mitzva in the Torah! ...
Rather, this pasuk serves as a serious warning to
refrain [from lashon ha-ra], be it in public or in
private, intentional or unintentional...and it should be
considered one of the 613 mitzvot..." (see Ramban 24:9).
Ramban here employs 'conceptual logic' - the very essence
of his pshat approach - to support his comprehensive
interpretation of these psukim. Because logically there must
be a mitzva in the Torah against speaking lashon ha-ra, Ramban
prefers to interpret this pasuk as one of the 613 mitzvot.
In this manner, Ramban utilizes a wider perspective of pshat
to reach a conclusion not only similar to the Midrash, but
also more poignant.
[If you would like to see an 'enhanced version' of
Ramban's explanation of this mitzva, read his commentary
to Rambam's Sefer Ha-mitzvot. At the conclusion of the
'mitzvot aseh' section, Ramban adds several mitzvot which
(in his opinion) Rambam had overlooked. In 'hasaga' #7,
Ramban adds this mitzva, that we must constantly remind
ourselves of the incident of Miriam in order to remember
not to speak lashon ha-ra.]
An 'AM' KADOSH with a 'PEH' KADOSH
Note as well that according to Ramban's interpretation,
the mitzva which emerges from these two psukim in Parshat Ki
Tetzeh is not only yet another mitzva bein adam le-chavero, it
also forms one of the most basic 'building block' towards
achieving the ultimate goal of Sefer Devarim to create and
establish an am kadosh.
Recall how the mitzvot of the main speech form the
guidelines for the establishment of God's model nation in the
land of Israel. Imagine an entire nation, where each
individual reminded himself daily of these stringent
guidelines concerning lashon ha-ra!
Anyone who would like to be 'machmir' [adhere to a more
stringent opinion] - especially on the 'de-'oraita' level, is
invited to take upon himself this 'chumra' [stringency]
explicated by Ramban.
shabbat shalom,
menachem
==========================
FOR FURTHER IYUN
A. Try to arrange the various opinions of the Rishonim
mentioned above into the following categories. Who considers:
1) 24:8 is the primary pasuk - 24:9 supports it.
2) 24:9 is the primary pasuk - 24:8 introduces it.
3) 24:8-9 should be read together, like one long pasuk.
B. Carefully review Rashbam and Chizkuni's comments on our
psukim. According to them, to whom is the prohibition in 24:8
directed? According to Rashi / Ramban?
A corresponding debate exists regarding Vayikra 13:2:
"Ve-
huva el Aharon ha-kohen." ("He shall be brought before
Aharon."). See Sefer Hachinuch 169 as opposed to the Rosh's
commentary on Masechet Zavim 3:2.
C. We noted Chazal's Midrash Halacha that interprets the
first of our two psukim as forbidding the surgical detachment
of a tzara'at infection. As we pointed out, Rashi adopts this
peirush of that pasuk, despite the fact that he understands
the reference to tzara'at here as primarily related to lashon
ha-ra.
The question, of course, arises, why would the Torah
mention specifically this particular detail of the laws of
tzara'at if the main focus here is on lashon ha-ra? Why is
this prohibition singled out from all of hilchot tzara'at for
mention here in the context of the prohibition of lashon ha-
ra?
Try to answer this question by reviewing the general
process imposed upon the metzora. See Rashi, Vayikra 13:47 &
14:4. In light of this, explain the prohibition of removing a
tzara'at infection and how this may reflect the severity of
lashon ha-ra. Bear in mind as well that the Ramban here
(24:8) extends this prohibition beyond severing the infection,
to mere refusal to show it to the kohen (thus avoiding the
entire process).
In honor of Elul, relate this concept to the process of
'teshuva' in general.
D. Those Rishonim who do not derive the prohibition of
removing a tzara'at infection from 24:8 (as the Gemara in
Makkot does) would presumably derive the prohibition from
Vayikra 13:33 - see Torat Kohanim there. Based on the context
of that pasuk, what advantage is there to learning the
prohibition from our pasuk instead? What might be the
difference between these two prohibitions? See Sefer
Hachinuch 170, as opposed to Ramban in his 'hasagot' to
Rambam's Sefer Hamitzvot lo ta'aseh 307-8. [There is also some
question as to the precise text of that passage in Torat
Kohanim - see Sefer Hachinuch's citation of Torat Kohanim in
mitzva 170 and Torah Shleima, Vayikra 13:109.]
E. Recall that according to Rashbam and Chizkuni, 24:9
teaches us not to make exceptions for public figures with
regard to the laws of tzara'at. Review their comments and
note that the 'hava amina' (original possibility) of exempting
leaders from these laws evolved from the honor and respect due
to them. We may, however, add another element to this hava
amina: national interests. A nation would understandably be
very reluctant to quarantine an important public official for
an indefinite period of time. Explain how, along the lines of
the Rashbam & Chizkuni but with our variation, we may explain
a seemingly superfluous phrase in the pasuk: ". on your
journey when you left the land of Egypt." (For a subtle hint,
see Targum Yonatan's explanation of this phrase.) Consider
especially the final clause of Bemidbar 12:15. (If you want
to cheat, look up Rav Zalman Sorotzkin's 'Oznayim La-Torah' on
our pasuk.)
F. For an interesting twist, see Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel on
24:9. According to his understanding, what sin does this
pasuk address? Is this wrongdoing related to lashon ha-ra?
Based on this Targum Yonatan, explain more fully Rashi's
comments on Shemot 4:6.
G. Note that the mitzva of 'kil'ayim' (see 22:9-12) is
another mitzva bein adam la-Makom, and hence seems out of
place in Parshat Ki Tetzeh. Based on the various laws
concerning forbidden marriages which continue in 22:13-23:9,
can you suggest a thematic connection between these mitzvot?
In this context, note Ramban's association between the
prohibition of plowing with an ox and donkey (pasuk 10) and
that of interbreeding (Vayikra 19:19). See also Rambam, Moreh
Nevuchim 3:49, who explicitly bases the prohibition here with
the halacha forbidding interbreeding. [Regarding sha'atnez,
however, he offers a much different explanation - Moreh
Nevuchim 3:37.]
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